1976: AGGRESSIVE GROWTH STRATEGY, LOW PRICE LENDING

1978-81: HIGH GROWTH, MGT LAUDED BY ANALYSTS, REGULATORS, AND THE MARKET

1981: LOANS/TA RISES FROM 58% TO 69% BUT ROA REMAINS AT 50BPCINB LENDING BELOW PRIME

1982: OIL PRICES DROP, NOT A "LITTLE BLIP": CINB AND ITS LOAN CUSTOMERS AREEXPOSED, NUCORP ENERGY IS BANKRUPT

1982: MARKET (BUT NOT ANALYSTS ) HAMMERS CINB

JULY 1982: PENN SQUARE FAILS: 2 CONSEQUENCES: THE SMELL OF DEATH & OIL ANDGAS "PARTICIPATION"

AUGUST 1982: MEXICO DEFAULTS (CINB HAS LATIN EXPOSURE)

FALL 1982: ANALYSTS SMELL DEATH BUT ROGER SAYS THEY'RE FINE

FALL 1982: TOUGH TO SELL CDs: CINB TURNS TO EURO MARKET

WED, MAY 9, 1984: RUMORS ABOUT CINB BANKRUPTCY: RUN ON THE BANK:EURODOLLARS GO: ELECTRONIC BANKING SPEEDS UP THE RUN

FRIDAY MAY 11, 1984: CINB BORROWS 3.6B AT TH DISCOUNT WINDOW + 4.5BINTERBANK: THE RUN INTENSIFIES

TBTF PHILOSOPHY: TEMPORARY PROBLEMS REQUIRE 'PERMANENT SOLUTION'

TBTF: THE "MAY PLAN": FDIC ARRANGES 2B AT TBILL+1%, FED OPENS THE 'DENNYS'DISCOUNT WINDOW, FDIC PROMISES TO PROTECT ALL DEPOSITORS.

TBTF: THE "JULY PLAN": FDIC PURCHASES 4.5B OF BAD LOANS FROM THE BANK ANDPURCHASES 1B OF NEW PFD SHARES. ROGER IS REPLACED WITH JOHN SWEARINGEN: P&A

1985: CINB FAILS

1986-1991: OTHER TBTF FAILURES: FIRST NATIONAL BANK AND TRUST OF OKLAHOMACITY, REPUBLICBANK OF DALLAS, MCORP OF HOUSTON, BANK OF NEW ENGLAND